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Abstract 
 
The rural northwestern districts of Bangladesh, home to 10 million people, experience a pre-
harvest seasonal famine, locally known as Monga, with disturbing regularity.  Surprisingly, out-
migration from the Monga-prone districts is not all that common.  This research tests whether 
migration could play any role in Monga mitigation.  We implemented a randomized intervention 
that provided monetary incentives to individuals in Monga-prone regions to seasonally out-
migrate during the pre-harvest season.  We experimentally varied the conditionalities attached to 
the incentives, such as a requirement to form a group and migrate jointly (as opposed to 
migrating individually), sometimes assigning migration partners and the destination, and varying 
group size. This paper reports just the first stage results of this randomized intervention project, 
where we focus on household responsiveness to our incentive offers in terms of their decision to 
migrate. Our cash and credit incentives had a very large effect on migration propensity: over 
40% of those receiving an incentive choose to migrate, whereas only 13% of control households 
do.  This large effect is consistent with the presence of savings or borrowing constraints for these 
households, since providing information on wages and employment conditions at destinations 
only has a negligible 2 percentage point impact on the propensity to migrate relative to the 
control group.   
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The Human Development Research Paper (HDRP) Series is a medium for sharing recent 
research commissioned to inform the global Human Development Report, which is published 
annually, and further research in the field of human development. The HDRP Series is a quick-
disseminating, informal publication whose titles could subsequently be revised for publication as 
articles in professional journals or chapters in books. The authors include leading academics and 
practitioners from around the world, as well as UNDP researchers. The findings, interpretations 
and conclusions are strictly those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of 
UNDP or United Nations Member States. Moreover, the data may not be consistent with that 
presented in Human Development Reports. 
1 Introduction
While Bangladesh as a whole is on target to achieve the primary United Nations
Millennium Development Goal of halving its 2000 level of extreme poverty by the
year 2015, certain regions of the country lag well behind in economic opportuni-
ties and outcomes. In the greater Rangpur districts of the Northwestern region
(NW) the incidence of poverty remains unusually high and chronic food shortages
and hunger remain enduring phenomena of rural life.1 These districts2 experience
seasonal deprivation and a famine-like situation, known locally as Monga, with dis-
turbing regularity. Although the occurrence of Monga is quite predictable - described
as a routine crisis (Rahman 1995) - and its effects widely chronicled in the local me-
dia, it hits Rangpur households year after year as though it were an unanticipated
shock. Roughly 7 percent of the total population in Bangladesh (about 9.6 million
people) inhabits these districts and about 5.3 million of those live below the poverty
line.3 The suffering during Monga thus is not limited to a small pocket of households.
This is a major failure of public policy in a country that, while desperately poor, has
made impressive strides in other aspects of development.
It is common for agricultural laborers in other regions of Bangladesh to either
1Calculations from the Bangladesh HIES (Household Income and Expenditures Survey) 2005
show that, the poverty headcount rate (defined as the fraction of the population living under the
upper poverty line) for the entire country was 40 percent; in comparison, in the greater Rangpur
districts in the NW, poverty rates were 57 percent. Extreme poverty rates (defined as population
living under the lower poverty line, i.e., individuals who cannot meet the 2100 calorie per day food
intake even if they spend their entire incomes on food purchases only) were 25 percent nationwide,
as opposed to 43 percent in the Rangpur region.
2Kurigram, Gaibandha, Lalmonirhat, Nilphamari and Rangpur
3Population figures are based on projections from the 2001 Census data and poverty figures are
from the HIES 2005.
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switch to local non-farm labor markets or to migrate to urban informal labor markets
in search of higher wages and employment opportunities in response to price hikes
and wage drops during the pre-harvest season. Surprisingly, despite the absence
of local non-farm employment opportunities, out-migration from the Monga prone
districts is not all that common even during periods of severe Monga (according to a
nationally representative survey, only 5% of households in Rangpur receive domestic
remittances, while 22% of all Bangladeshi households do). The primary objective
of our research is to understand the constraints to temporary seasonal migration
using a randomized intervention study, where we experimentally vary incentives to
out-migrate during Monga season across households living in 100 villages in two
Monga districts named Kurigram and Lalmonirhat. We also experimentally vary
the conditions attached to the monetary incentives, such as a requirement to form
a group and migrate or a requirement to migrate to a specified destination. These
interventions thus create randomized variation in both the migration decision as
well as conditions relevant to the migration experience, such as risk sharing or job
information sharing across members of a migrant group, or the presence of a pre-
existing social network at the destination.
These interventions test whether integration of labour markets through migration
could play any role in Monga mitigation. We primarily seek to understand why
Monga-affected workers appear hesitant to seasonally migrate to better employment
opportunities. Given the constructed variation in incentives and conditionals, we are
also in a position to identify (a) the causal effect of migration of one family member
on the poverty status and other welfare outcomes for the household, (b) the role of
networks and kinship in supporting migrants, and (c) whether promoting migration is
a cost-effective policy response to mitigate the severe welfare consequences of Monga.
While the experimental variation in the interventions and conditions can thus be used
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to causally identify both the causes and consequences of seasonal migration (or lack
thereof), we will limit our focus to only the decision to migrate in this paper. The
interventions were implemented in September 2008 on a randomly chosen subset of
1900 households, and thus far we have conducted a baseline survey on all households,
and tracked the migrants either at the destinations or back at their origin (for those
who have returned). We therefore have data on the households response to our
offer in terms of their migration decision, but it is still too early to track secondary
outcomes such as changes in poverty and welfare. Our data analysis therefore focuses
on the determinants of the migration decision.
In our major experimental treatment we offer a random subset of households a
monetary incentive to migrate either in the form of cash or credit, which distinguishes
them from others receiving only information about employment and wage conditions
at certain destinations or nothing at all. A random subset of those receiving a
monetary incentive are required to migrate in groups of either 2 or 3 as a condition
of receiving our money, and a fraction of those groups were specified by us, while
for the rest the households had some choice regarding whom to migrate with from
a limited set of options. Destinations are also specified for a random subset of the
households receiving an incentive, while the rest could choose from a limited set of
cities where we had offices and enumerators stationed (to help track the migration
experience) and still take advantage of the subsidy. To understand and interpret the
potential effects of any of these incentives or conditions, we first theorize about the
conditions under which households would react to our experiments. We note that a
household that has freedom of movement would only be swayed by our offer of cash
or credit if they are constrained in their ability to save or to borrow. Our theory
also notes that if households share a valuable service (e.g. information about jobs,
risk sharing or fixed cost sharing) when migrating in pairs, then a requirement to
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form a group can have an ambiguous effect on their propensity to migrate. The basic
intuition is that while households benefit by smoothing outcomes, a weaker partner
may reduce the net benefits on migrating. Somewhat counter-intuitively, a restriction
on migration choices here can actually increase the amount of migration for weaker
agents. Finally, our theory shows that a restriction on choices of destination will
weakly reduce the migration rate.
Empirically, our experimental incentives have a very large effect on households
propensity to out-migrate from monga-prone areas. Just over 40% of households
receiving our monetary incentive choose to migrate, while about 13% of control
group households do. This nearly three-fold increase in migration is consistent with
the presence of savings or borrowing constraints for these households, since providing
information on wages and employment conditions at destinations only has a negligible
(statistically insignificant) 2 percentage point impact on the propensity to migrate
relative to the control group. Consistent with our theoretical predictions, the group
formation requirement does not deter migration, but requiring migrants to go to a
specified destination does.
2 Treatment Description and Experimental De-
sign
This section describes the project design in greater detail. The project can be de-
scribed as a randomized field experiment where incentives to promote seasonal out-
migration of one household member during the Monga period was randomly allocated
across households. We conducted a census of 100 villages in Lalmonirhat and Kuri-
gram (two districts in the Monga-prone regions of north-western Bangladesh) in June
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2008 to identify households at greatest risk and identified all households in these vil-
lages that met two pre-determined eligibility criteria (based on landownership and
food availability during the last Monga season) for an intervention. We surveyed a
random sub-sample of 1900 eligible households during the pre-monga season in July
2008 (baseline survey). In August, 2008 we randomly assigned all households to a
variety of incentives and conditions which are described in more detail below. The
random assignment was conducted using a pure random number generator in Stata
by the first two authors (Chowdhury and Mobarak) without any input from the vil-
lage residents or the NGOs who subsequently implemented the interventions. The
NGOs were trained on the implementation procedure by Chowdhury and Mobarak
in August 2008, and the incentives were implemented during the 2008 Monga season
starting in September.
Of the 100 villages, 16 (consisting of 304 sample households) were randomly as-
signed to form a control group. A further 16 villages (consisting of another 304 sample
households) were placed in a job information only treatment. These households were
given information on types of jobs available in four pre-selected destinations, the
likelihood of getting such a job and approximate wages associated with each type of
job and destination. The details of the destination selection are discussed below.
The remaining 1392 households were provided monetary incentives to seasonally
out-migrate, and their treatment and conditions varied along the following dimen-
sions:
• Type of Incentive (Cash or Credit)
• Individual migration versus a group formation requirement
• Group formation method (Assigned or Self Selected)
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• Group Size
• Destination (Assigned a particular city, or self-selected from a limited set)
Incentives: The 68 remaining villages (consisting of 1392 households) were ran-
domly assigned to either receive (a) job information and cash transfers conditional on
migration, or (b) job information and an equivalent amount of credit conditional on
migration. Under the cash incentive, the 703 sample households in 37 randomly se-
lected villages were offered cash of Taka 800 ( US11.50), ofwhichTaka600( US8.50)
was offered at origin conditional on migration and Taka 200 at the destination once
the migrant reported to our office at the destination. In both the cash and credit
treatments we provided exactly the same information about jobs and wages as in
the information-only treatment. Under the credit incentive, 589 households in 31
randomly selected villages were offered a loan of Taka 800 conditional on migration,
of which Taka 600 was given at origin and Taka 200 at destination. Households were
told that they would have to pay back the loan at the end of the Monga season. De-
tailed descriptions of the information and instructions provided with these incentives
are in the Appendix. Note that the randomization of incentives was administered at
the village level, whereas all other conditions described below can vary (randomly)
within each village.
Individual versus Group Formation Requirement and group formation
method: One of the treatment conditions that we implemented was encouraging
individuals to migrate (treatment A) versus encouraging group migration, where the
groups were in one case assigned by us (treatment B) and in another case self-formed
(treatment C) subject to constraints we imposed (such as a constraint on group size
discussed in the next paragraph). The total number of households that were offered
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incentives under treatment A, B, and C were 476, 408 and 408, respectively.
Group size: For the households that were offered incentives under group treat-
ments, one of the additional constraints that we imposed was group size that varied
between two and three. The total number of households that were offered incentives
under group size two and group size three were 420 and 396, respectively.
Destinations: : Under the destination dimensions, all treated households were
randomly assigned into one of the two groups:
1. in one case, destinations were assigned by us, and
2. in another case, households could choose among four possible destinations.
The total number of households in each treatment was 646. We preselected four
possible migration destinations based on the history of our sample households past
migration destination choices as reported in the baseline survey (popular versus not
so popular), ii) the size of the urban area (large versus small) and (iii) distance from
the origin (relatively close versus relatively far from the origin).
PKSFs partner organizations, POs, (NGOs, PKSF calls them POs) that have
operations in those areas collected information from all four selected destinations on
types of jobs available (sector/job title), the likelihood of getting such a job (high,
moderate, low), and approximate wages associated with each type of job. The table
below provides the destination specific information given to households.
In the baseline survey conducted in July 2008, households were asked about their
networks (number of friends) within and outside their village including migration
destinations. We expect that among the assigned households, in some cases migrants
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were assigned to destinations where they have a network and in other cases theyre
not.
Table 2 shows the distribution of households under the randomization dimensions
discussed above.
Steps we followed in the randomization process were:
Step 1: For each village, we randomly assigned surveyed households into two dif-
ferent subcategories of 7 and 12 households.
Step 2: In the first sub-category, we offered one of the incentives (information/
cash/ credit). The household decided if to accept to our offer and whom to
send and how to go (individually or in group).
In the second sub-category, we offered incentives as above conditional on form-
ing self-selected groups (either 2 or 3) and migrating in groups. Alternatively,
we offered incentives conditional on migrating in groups where we randomly
assigned households in groups (either 2 or 3).
In each village there were two treatments individual treatment and one of
the group treatments (self-formed or assigned group). Incentives offered in a
village remained same.
In the case of cash or credit, Taka 600 was given once the offer, conditional
on constraints, was accepted by the households. The remaining cash or credit
of Taka 200 in destination was provided only if an individual migrated to our
preferred destinations. They collected the cash/credit from our project officer
there. This also ensured that we could keep track of them.
Individuals/groups who decided to migrate to other destinations reported to
the project officer in origin (we provided project officers cell phone number).
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Individual/groups who did not migrate returned the incentive package to the
project officer in origin.
Step 3: Individuals/groups who had migrated to our selected destination were in-
terviewed by our project officer on job search, networks etc. Individuals/groups
those who had migrated to other destinations were interviewed at origin upon
return.
Step 4: Household survey round 2 conducted in December 2008 after the Monga
season collected information on migration and remittance in addition to con-
sumption and welfare indicators.
Figure 1 in Appendix shows the randomization process.
3 Theoretical Framework
In this section we present a theoretical framework that helps to understand con-
straints on the migration decision, and the potential impact of our intervention. It
should be seen as providing a background to our intervention and the types of be-
havior that we are interested in investigating. We model the decision to migrate as
a three period investment problem. In time period 1, an agent receives income y
and decides on a mount of consumption c, saving the remainder at rate of interest
r. In time period 2 the agent receives no income and can decide to migrate or not;
migration requires a fixed cost F . Income available for consumption in period 2 is
then r(y − c) − F . If the individual decides to remain at home, period 3 expected
utility is u(h) while if the agent decides to migrate period 3 expected utility is u(m).
We assume throughout that u(m) > u(h) and that the agent is a discounted ex-
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pected utility maximize with discount rate δ, but also consider the possibility and
implications of hyperbolic discounting.
Implicitly we are assuming that there is no ability to save between periods 2 and 3,
and at this stage we ignore the prospect of borrowing. These simplifying assumptions
allow us to concentrate on the migration decision without worrying about income
smoothing, but our main results would not be affected by altering these assumptions.
Our analysis proceeds in several steps. First, we treat u(m) and F as given and
consider the saving decision which allows agents to cover the fixed costs of migration
in the absence of credit. Second, we informally discuss the role of credit in our setting
and argue that our empirical results imply that there are strong credit constraints,
which justify our assuming no borrowing when thinking about saving. Third, we
consider the possibility that agents can share the fixed costs of migrating and argue
that this possibility gives rise to a coordination game between potential migrants.
Fourth, we consider the determinants of u(m). We argue that the possibility that
migrants: share, and compete for, job information; and engage in risk sharing, imply
that u(m) will depend on the identity and location choice of other migrants and that
this may be an impediment to migration. Finally, we consider the impact of these
observations on the decision to migrate in our experiment.
3.1 The Saving Decision and Saving Constraints
We say that a potential migrant is saving constrained if she does not migrate, but
would have migrated if she had the ability to save at the market interest rate. The
literature considers three sources of such constraints:4 low access to formal saving
facilities; time inconsistency; and social norms of income redistribution. We consider
4See for example, Armendariz de Aghion and Morduch (2005).
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here the impact of the first two on the migration decision.
First, suppose that for an exogenous reasons there are two types of agents, those
for whom r = 1 and those for whom r = r¯ > 1, where r¯ is the market interest
rate on saving. For an exponential discounter the optimal saving problem is solved
backward. In period 2 the agent will choose to migrate if
u(r(y − c)− F ) + δu(m) ≥ u(r(y − c)) + δu(h).
The solution to this problem defines a cutoff value of c(r) such that if c > c(r) the
agent will not migrate in period 2 and if c < c(r) the agent will migrate in period
2. It is clear that c(r) is a decreasing function of r, so that agents with r = 1 must
save more in order to migrate.
In period 1 the agent will choose c knowing the cutoff value c(r). As the amount
of saving required to migrate is decreasing in r, agents that have a higher r are more
likely to migrate. Our definition of savings constraints is then that an agent with
r = 1 does not migrate, but would have if r = r¯.
Next we turn to a different form of saving constraints coming from the possibility
that agents have hyperbolic preferences. We consider a model in which the agent has
a β < 1 but is naive about this fact, believing that β = 1. Under this assumption
the second period decision becomes, migrate if
u(r(y − c)− F ) + βδu(m) ≥ u(r(y − c)) + βδu(h).
Define c(r, β) to be the cutoff value of c below which migration takes place. It is
clear that c(r, β) is increasing in β and therefore those with higher β require less
saving in order to migrate. If an agent is naive with respect to β then it is possible
to undersave in period 1 and therefore not have enough money to invest in period 2.
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3.2 Borrowing Constraints
As noted above, our experiment allows us to directly test for borrowing constraints.
A random selection from our sample were offered credit to allow them to migrate.
The difference in takeup in this group compared to the control group identifies the
impact of borrowing constraints.5 Our empirical analysis below strongly supports
the argument that there are borrowing constraints, household given credit were much
more likely to migrate, and there is little difference in migration rates between those
offered credit and those offered cash. However, this finding is also consistent with
saving constraints and begs the question as to why households which face the poten-
tial for Monga every year have not been able to accumulate the assets to deal with
this regular event? We will consider this issue in more detail in future work.
3.3 The Sharing of Fixed Costs
In this section we extend the model to allow for two kinds of costs to migration,
an individual specific cost FI and a shareable fixed cost FS. The shareable cost
can be split between the two individuals if they migrate to the same location. We
also introduce a second location choice so that the utility away from home is either
ui(a) = w
a
i in location a for agent i or ui(b) = w
b
i for location b where w
j
i is simply
the wage in location j for agent i.
Ignoring the saving and borrowing decision, an individual, deciding whether to
migrate alone will migrate if
max
{
wai )− FI − FS, wbi − FI − FS
}
≥ wh
5Incorporating borrowing constraints in to the formal model is straight forward and shows that
agents with borrowing constraints are less likely to migrate.
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and will migrate to the location in which the wage rate is highest. Next consider
the joint migration decision of two individuals. First, wa1 > w
b
1 ⇒ wa2 > wb2, then the
two individuals will always migrate to location i and the decision to migrate will be
determined by
wa1 + w
a
2 + 2FI + FS ≥ 2wh.
This implies that migration is more likely in the case where there is the potential for
cost sharing.
Second, consider the case where wi1 > w
j
1 but w
j
2 > w
i
2, then as a group, the two
will migrate if
max
{
wai + w
b
i − 2FI − FS, waj + wbj − 2FI − FS
}
> u(h)
this implies that there is the potential that one of the individuals will migrate to a
location that they less prefer in order to share the costs of migration.
The implication of this simple model are two fold. First, individuals are more
likely to migrate when they can find an individual to migrate with, who has similar
preferences in terms of migration location and second, individuals will potentially
migrate to a different location in order to share costs.
As noted above, the potential for the sharing of fixed costs also gives rise to the
possibility of a coordination game. Consider again the saving decision. If an agent
is not able to save enough to migrate alone, but can save enough to migrate in a
pair, then it is only worth saving if another agent has also saved. Thus migration in
this case will requires that agents coordinate on a saving decision. While we are not
able to test directly for this, empirical evidence in favor of cost sharing will tend to
support this argument.
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3.4 Group Determinants of u(m)
In this section we discuss how the identity and characteristics of migrating individ-
uals will affect the return to migration. Specifically we discuss the impact of job
information sharing and risk sharing, and show that both may have either positive
or negative impacts on the decision to migrate.
3.4.1 Job Information Sharing
In this section we discuss the implications of social networks for job finding and
migration. The presence of network effects in the labor market is a possible expla-
nation for the low level of migration during Monga. Calvo-Armengol and Jackson
(2004), for example, argue that labor market dropout has a contagion effect through
social networks, leading some groups to have persistently lower participation rates.
In our context, participation in the urban labor market requires migration, and the
presence of strong network effects provides a possible rationale for the low migration
levels of the subset of Bangladeshi’s living in the Monga prone regions. In the Calvo-
Armengol and Jackson model a small difference in the initial quality of the social
network can lead to sustained differences in participation, and therefore migration
levels. There is a small empirical literature that considers the impact of social net-
works on the job opportunities of permanent migrants. Munshi (2004) shows that
Mexican migrants with exogenously larger social networks have a higher probability
of employment while Beaman (2008) shows that competition within networks can
mean that larger networks are not always beneficial.
In our application the impact of social networks comes through both the choice of
migration partner and the quality of the network already existing at the destination.
To model this situation simply, consider the migration decision of two individuals,
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i = 1, 2. We assume the existence of two individuals from the same region as 1 and 2
at the migration destination and we label these individuals a and b. The friendship
level between each pair can be summarized by a number cij where cij = cji.
Consider the following employment dynamics. Prior to the migration decision,
t = 0 agents 1 and 2 are either employed e0i = 1 or unemployed e
0
i = 0. After
migration there is one period t = 1 in which the new migrants (1 and 2) can become
employed or not. In period t = 1 each individual hears about the existence of a job
with probability pi. If agent i hears about job information then, if he is unemployed he
takes the job for himself. If he is currently employed he passes the job information to
agent j where j = argmaxl∈Ui cil and Ui is the set of unemployed workers known to i.
If all of the acquantances of i are employed, then the job information is transfered to
an acquaintance of j by the same rule. Any individual that receives job information
will then be employed in the next period.
To map this situation back to our overall framework, the probability of getting a
job is a key determinant of u(m). This section therefore analyses the determinants
of u(m) arguing that it will be higher the better the network available to the migrant
at her destination, but will also depend on the characteristics of others migrating at
the same time.
In this framework it is clear that the amount of migration depends on the quality
of the network, in the sense that 1 and 2 have a higher chance of gaining employment
if a and b are already employed. It will also be the case that the larger the network at
the destination, the more likely is migration - a point that is borne out in our empir-
ical analysis. However, the probability of migration is not monotonic in the strength
of connections of the other migrating agent. To see this second claim, consider the
migration decision of agent 1. We first show that increasing the connections of agent
2 may increase the probability of 1 migrating.
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Example 1 Suppose that c1b = c1a = 0 and that c21 > c2a = c2b = c. Con-
sider first the case in which c = 0. Then the probability of 1 getting a job in pe-
riod 1 at the destination is pi. On the other hand, suppose that c > 0 and that
both a and b are employed in period 0. Then the probability of a finding a job is
pi + (1 − pi)(pi(1 − (1 − pi2)) + (1 − pi)pi2). Which shows that in this example the
probability of getting a job in period 1 is increasing in the connections of b. In this
example, agent 1 benefits from the possibility that agent 2 will pass on job information.
Next we show that it is possible that increasing connections can decrease the
amount of migration.
Example 2 Suppose that c1a = c1b = c1 > 0 and that c21 > c2a = c2b = c2. Sup-
pose first that c1 < c2. Then the probability of a getting a job in the first period is
pi+(1−pi)(1− (1−pi)2). Next consider the case in which cb > ca, then the probability
of a getting a job is pi + (1 − pi)pi2 which shows that the probability of getting a job
decreases as the connections of agent b increases.
The non-monotonicity occurs in these examples because in example 2 agent 2
overtakes agent 1 as the preferred person to pass jobs to, while in example 1 he does
not. We conclude that migration will be increasing in the quality of the network
at the destination, but that there is competition between migrating agents for the
services of the existing network. This highlights the fact that the network can only
support a limited amount of migration in any time period.
In terms of the decision to migrate in our experiment, this discussion implies that
there are both negative and positive externalities between agents and as we show in
section 3.5, this implies that there may be either costs of benefits to requiring agents
16
to migrate in groups in our experiment. We discuss this implication further below.
3.4.2 Risk Sharing
In this section we consider the possibility of sharing the risks of migrating. We
model the possibility of risk sharing very simply to highlight that the possibility of
risk sharing may have a positive or negative impact on the amount of migration.
Within our basic framework consider two individuals that are considering migrating.
We suppose that there is only one period of migration and that each individual
is either employed or not employed. Therefore there are four states of the world
(e, u), (e, e), (u, e), (u, u) where (e, u) indicates that agent 1 is employed while agent
2 is unemployed. We assume that agent i has probability pi of finding employment.
We follow Ambrus, Mobius and Szeidl (2009) in assuming that there is a risk
sharing contract which specifies for each of the possible states of the world a transfer
between the parties. This contract is enforced through the existence of social collat-
eral. Specifically the value of the relationship between agent 1 and agent 1 is c, and
we assume that if a transfer required under the risk sharing contract is not made
the friendship is severed. Utility is given by u(y, c) = u(y + c) where y′ is income
net of transfers and c is the value of social connections. In this context assume that
the wage when employed is wm, then the risk sharing contract specifies that in state
(e, u) a transfer of min{wh/2, c} from agent 1 to agent 2.
Again this discussion allows us to better understand the determinants of u(m),
while ignoring the saving and borrowing decision.
Within this context we show that the presence of risk sharing can be either
beneficial or detrimental to migration. Suppose that two agents are characterized
by a pair (whi , pi) where w
h
i is the wage at home and pi is the probability of finding
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a job after migrating. We assume that whi > w
h
j implies pi > pj so that there is
some measure of underlying quality of the worker. The following example shows
that depending on the value of parameters, risk sharing might have a positive or a
negative effect on migration.
Example 3 Assume that wh1 > w
h
2 and that w
h
1 < p1w
m−F so that agent 1 wishes
to migrate individually, but that wh2 > p2w
m − F so that agent 2 does not wish to
migrate individually. Suppose that c ≥ wm/2 so that there will be perfect risk sharing,
then the payoff to agent i of migrating is
pipjw
m + (1− pi)pjwm/2 + (1− pj)piwm/2 = (p1 + p2)wm/2.
therefore so long as p1 > p2 risk sharing increases the payoff to migration for player
2 but decreases the payoff to player 1. Given this observation, it is possible that
wh2 < (p1 + p2)w
m/2− F
and
wh1 < (p1 + p2)w
m/2− F
in which case both will migrate and there is a positive impact of risk sharing on
migration. On the other hand, it is possible that
wh2 < (p1 + p2)w
m/2− F
and
wh1 > (p1 + p2)w
m/2− F
in which case, agent 2 would like to migrate so long as agent 1 will migrate, but agent
1 does not wish to migrate if agent 2 migrates.
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This highlights the possible negative impact of risk sharing - the fact that agent 1
will have to look after agent 2 implies that it is not worthwhile for agent 1 to migrate.
This example also indicates that the effect of an increase in social connectedness
is ambiguous. To see this, suppose that we are in the case in which risk sharing
increases migration, then there exists a cutoff value c¯ past which both agents will
migrate. However, in the other case there exists c above which neither agent will
migrate.
To what extent does this provide a rationalization for the observation that there
is low migration in the monga season? One possible impact of Monga is that it
increases the gap in wages for those who remain at home. In the example above this
will tend to lead to low quality workers having a low wage which will imply that the
second scenario, in which high quality workers must subsidise low quality workers at
the destintion, is more likely to occur.
Similar to the sharing of job information, risk sharing implies that agents will
care who they migrate with, and will be key to understanding migration decision in
our experiment.
3.5 The Migration Decision in Our Experiment
In this section we discuss the implications of the above discussion on the migration
decision in our experiment. The experiment randomly allocates different individuals
to have to migrate in specific groups and therefore the key issue we wish to understand
is how this will affect the probability that agents migrate and also the identify of
migrating individuals.
We model as situation in which an agent wishing to migrate must decide on
a location and also who to migrate with. We assume that there are N possible
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individuals to migrate with and L possible locations (we assume that N is even
throughout as it will be in our empirical setting). Individuals derive utility from
both the location they migrate to and the group of people they migrate with and
we denote ui(S, l) the utility agent i derives from migrating to location l with group
S ⊆ {0, . . . , N}. The utility from migrating as a group varies because there is the
possibility to share fixed costs, job information and risk, as discussed above. Finally,
we denote ui(0, l) as the utility from migrating alone to location l and ui(0, 0) as the
utility from remaining at home.
In the context of our model above, we are again discussing the determination of
u(m) and how it will be affected by the migration decisions of other agents. We
place no restrictions on the form that these utilities can take. Obviously, different
individuals will have different preferences over migration location. Further our dis-
cussion above outlines several reasons why ui(j, l) > ui(0, l). For example, if the two
individuals are able to share the costs of transport, or lodging at the destination or
if the two are able to share risk and job information at the destination. However,
we also outlined situations in which ui(j, l) < ui(0, l). For example, agent i may
have an obligation to share risk with agent j, and if agent j has a low probability
of finding a job, the relationship may be a burden on i so that she would prefer to
locate individually.
We wish to understand how different restrictions on the location and partner
choice will affect the amount of people that choose to migrate. To do this we model
the situation as a non-cooperative game. The game simply requires that each agent
announce a choice l ∈ {0, 1, . . . , L}. It is then assumed that agents migrate according
to their announcement. Within this context we consider three progressive restrictions
on the decisions of the players:
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1 Group Required: In order to migrate players must form a group of 2 or more
individuals and migrate to the same location;
2 Group Specified: Individuals must migrate in specific groups of 2; and
3 Location Specified: Individuals must migrate in specific groups of 2, and the
location of migration is specified.
Our main result is that the move from no restrictions to restriction 1 (adding the
group migration requirements) has an ambiguous effect on the amount of migration,
as does the move to restriction 3 from 2 (specifying the makeup of the group), while
the move from 2 to 3 (specifying the destination) leads to a decrease in the amount of
migration. First we provide an example in which requiring group migration increases
the amount of migration:
Example 1: Assume that the utility of 1 and 2 are dependent and so are the util-
ity of 3 and 4 but that there are no interactions across these pairs. So for ex-
ample, because 1 does not know 3: u1(S ∪ 3, l) = u1(S, l). Consequently denote
u1({1, 2, 3}, l) = u1(2, l). Assume also that there are two locations, A and B. Next
assume for i = 1, 3; ui(0, A) = ui(0, B) > ui(i + 1, A) = ui(i + 1, B) > ui(0, 0) and
for j = 2, 4; uj(j − 1, A) > uj(0, 0) > uj(j − 1, B) > uj(0, A) = uj(0, B). Then
the equilibrium without restrictions is that agent 1 migrates to location B and agent
2 does not migrate and likewise agent 3 migrates to location B while agent 4 does
not migrate. The equilibrium under restriction 1 however, implies that all agents
migrate to location B. Therefore, in this example, the restriction to migrate to the
same location increases the amount of migration.
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Example 1 is somewhat counterintuitive, implying as it does that a restriction
on migration choices can lead to more migration. The reason this can occur is that
agent 2(4) imposes an externality on agent 1(3). So, for example, agent 2 might be a
low quality worker and have a very low probability of finding a job after migration.
If there is a risk sharing norm in place that requires agent 1 to help agent 2, then
agent 2 will be a burden on agent 1, implying that she will try to avoid migrating
with agent 2. This example suggests that if there is an increase in the amount of
migration in the move from no restriction to restriction 1, it should come through the
creation of groups that have a high level of social connection and should increase the
migration levels of “low skill” agents. We will test for this heterogeneous treatment
effect in our empirical work. Next we provide an example in which the restriction
leads to a reduction in migration:
Example 2: We again assume that the utility of agents 1 and 2 are not affected
by the choice of 3 and 4 and vice versa. Therefore we consider only the choices of
agents 1 and 2. Suppose that u1(0, A) = u1(0, B) > u1(0, 0) > u1(2, A) > u1(2, B)
and u2(1, A) > u2(0, 0) > u2(1, B) > u2(0, A) = u2(0, B). Then the equilibrium with-
out restrictions is that agent 1 migrates to location B and agent 2 does not migrate.
The equilibrium under restriction 1 implies that neither agent migrates. Therefore,
in this example, the restriction to migrate to the same location decreases the amount
of migration.
Again, agent 1 does not wish to migrate with agent 2, and so the equilibrium
without restrictions implies that only one of the agents migrates. However, agent 1
strictly prefers to stay home than to migrate with agent 2, therefore the restriction
on the migration decision implies that agent 1 does not migrate in equilibrium. In
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contrast to example 1, the intuition in this example implies that it will be those
agents that are “high skill” that are likely to be pushed out of migration by the
intervention. We will again test for this in the empirical section. Overall, we also
note that the requirement to coordinate with others on a destination will tend to
reduce migration as the number of restrictions increase. We record the observations
from example 1 and 2 as proposition 1.
Proposition 1 The amount of migration under restriction 1 may be greater than
or less than the amount of migration without restrictions.
Next we turn to the impact of specifying the makeup of groups. Building on
the intuition of examples 1 and 2 it is easy to see that this restriction need not
lead to a reduction in migration. Again, we first provide an example in which the
restriction increases the amount of migration. Without formalizing the utility levels,
it is easy to see that there exists an equilibrium under restriction 1 such that {1, 2}
is a migrating group and 3 and 4 choose to not migrate. For example, this structure
would be implied by preferences where 1 and 2 prefer to migrate to location A, but
3 and 4 will only migrate to location B and will only migrate there if one of 1 and 2
choose to migrate to B. Then, under restriction 2, the randomization is equally likely
to generate each of the following migrating groups: {(1, 2), (3, 4)}; {(1, 3), (2, 4)};
and {(1, 4), (2, 3)}. It is easy to see that one can construct preferences such that all
individuals migrate in all but the first case. Therefore, under restriction 3, expected
migration is 10/3 but expected migration under restriction 1 is only 2. As above, it
is expects that agents that are induced to migrate will be of “low skill” and will be
socially connected to others that are migrating.
Next we consider whether it is possible that specifying the makeup of groups
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decreases the amount of migration. Again it is simple to construct an example in
which this is the case. Suppose that under restriction 1 pair {1, 2}migrate to location
A and always receive 0 utility from migrating to location B and pair {3, 4} migrate
to location B and receive 0 utility migrating to location A. Then expected migration
under restriction 1 is 4, while under restrictoin 2 it is 4/3. As above, we might
expect this restriction to impact the high skilled who would have migrated anyway
to a greater extent. We collect these simple observations as proposition 2.
Proposition 2 The amount of migration under restriction 2 may be greater than
or less than the amount of migration under restriction 1.
Finally, we consider the impact of specifying the location of migration. In this
case we can show that the restriction will weakly reduce the amount of migration.
Proposition 3 The amount of migration under restriction 3 is weakly less than
the amount of migration under restriction 2.
We outline a sketch of the proof of this fact. Let l be the imposed location
decision for any two agents and suppose that they decide to migrate. This implies
that migrating to location l must be preferred to not migrating by both agents and
this in turn implies that migrating to l must either be an equilibrium under restriction
1, or migrating to location −l must have an even higher payoff. Hence migration
must have been optimal under restriction 2. Therefore if migration is optimal under
restriction 3, it must also be optimal under restriction 2 and we therefore conclude
that there will be weakly less migration under restriction 3.
24
4 Empirical Results
We focus our data analysis on examining the household migration response to our
randomly allocated incentives and conditions. An examination of averages of house-
hold and village characteristics confirms that we achieved balance across treatment
conditions. In other words, the randomization was applied correctly and our sample
size was large enough that other relevant differences across treatment villages were
within noise of each other. We therefore present mostly statistical tests of mean com-
parisons across randomization conditions without adding covariates to the analysis.
We later address the fact our incentive treatment was implemented at the village
level by clustering standard errors by village in regression analysis. We also exam-
ine heterogenous treatment effects (by non-random baseline characteristics) in these
regressions.
The dependent variable in all analysis reported is whether the household migrated
in the 3 month period following the implementation of our incentives. Table 3 exam-
ines this out-migration propensity across the four groups created by the village-level
randomized incentives: Cash, Credit, Information or a Control. Just over 40% of
Cash and Credit recipients migrated after the incentive was offered, while only 14Ta-
ble 4 shows that adding a group formation requirement to the monetary transfer has
no detectable effect on households propensity to migrate. Simply requiring house-
holds to form a group does not affect the migration rate, while assigning specific
migration partners reduces the rate by over 4 percentage points, although this effect
is small and not statistically distinguishable from zero. Our theory predicted that
these effects would be ambiguous. Table 5 shows that requiring a larger group (3
rather than 2) reduces migration propensity by almost 6 percentage points, and that
this effect is marginally statistically significant. Larger groups may imply a different
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set of coordination problems and a different dynamic with respect to risk sharing
and job information sharing, which we have not modelled. Table 6 shows that this
negative effect of larger groups is somewhat heterogenous with respect to whether we
required the potential migrants to choose specific partners or gave them the choice
to form their own groups within a limited set of people. When partners are assigned,
the larger group reduces migration propensity by only 3 percentage points whereas
in self-chosen groups, the larger group reduces migration propensity by almost 9
percentage points. This suggests that coordination issues with respect to forming
groups, and finding the right set of partners may be important.
Table 7 shows that when households are required to migrate to specified destina-
tions, their take-up of our incentive is reduced by 7.4 percentage points. Our theory
predicted that this is a requirement that would reduce the probability of migrating,
unlike the group formation requirement. The difference between assigned and chosen
destinations is statistically significant, and is retained in the regressions even after
we control for additional covariates and cluster standard errors. Table 8 shows that
this destination effect varies by the identity of the particular city that is specified.
Distance from the origin to the destination matters a lot. Bogra and Tangail are sim-
ilar sized cities with comparable market opportunities, except that Tangail is much
farther away. Our sample households have a 12 percentage point greater likelihood
of migrating to the closer city Bogra than to Tangail. The size of the labor market
seems to matter as well. Migrants are 6 percentage points more likely to take-up our
offer when Dhaka is specified as the destination compared to when a nearby smaller
town, Munshiganj is offered. This difference is not statistically significant when a
Bonferroni multiple comparison test is used.
Finally, Tables 9 and 10 turn to regression analysis to more formally explore
some of these statistical differences. Beginning with table 9, specification 1 shows
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that the 26 percentage effect on migration of providing a monetary incentive is highly
statistically significant even after errors are conservatively clustered by village, which
is the level at which this randomization was applied. Specification 2 shows that
the assignment of destination is also statistically significant, and it leads to a 7.5
percentage point decrease in the propensity to migrate. Not imposing a requirement
to form a group or allowing a choice of partners when the group requirement is applied
increases the chances of migration slightly, but these differences are not statistically
distinguishable from zero. Specification 3 shows that requiring households to form
larger groups of 3 (rather than pairs) has a statistically significant reduction in
migration probability of 6.1 percentage points.
Specification 4 adds household characteristics and we find that wealthier house-
holds are less likely to migrate. We use a proxy for wealth based on the type of home
the household resides in. We also control for households subjective expectations of
future events, taking advantage of survey questions where we asked households to
assign probabilities to future events on a 0-100 scale. Households that placed a 10
percent higher probability on Monga occurring this year when they were asked at
our baseline survey (in July 2008, two months prior to the Monga season) were 12
percentage points more likely to actually migrate during the monga season. House-
holds that placed a 10 percent higher probability on receiving help from friends and
relatives in Dhaka if they migrated there were about 8.4 percentage points more
likely to actually migrate subsequently. Finally, households that place a 10 percent
higher likelihood on random strangers being trustworthy are 7.4 percentage points
more likely to migrate.
We find weak evidence that controlling for income, literate households are more
likely to migrate, but the 4 percentage point effect of being literate is not statistically
different from zero. This is coupled with weak evidence that literate households
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respond differentially to our incentive that they are less likely to be swayed by the
offer of cash or credit. There is no evidence of a heterogenous treatment effect with
respect to income.
In Table 10 we explore the migration responsiveness of households who were ran-
domly placed in the group conditions as a function of the characteristics of their
potential partners or assigned partners. Overall we find that the observable charac-
teristics of either potential, or assigned group members do not have a large impact
on the migration decision.
Specification 1 considers the impact of the characteristics of potential group mem-
bers (i.e. when group membership was not assigned). While most characteristics have
the intuitive sign, the effects are generally small, and not statistically significant. For
example, the average wealth of potential group members lowers the likelihood of mi-
gration, reflecting our earlier finding that those with higher wealth are less likely
to wish to migrate. The one exception is the impact of literacy amongst potential
group members, which lowers the probability of migration by 18 percentage points.
This potentially refects the fact that literate households were less likely to respond
to the incentives offered, and may, therefore, have been less likely to be willing to
form groups in order to receive incentives.
The remaining three specifications consider the impact of the characteristics of
an assigned migration group, with specification 2 considering income, specification
3 adding the impact of literacy and specification 4 the impact of education. The
coefficients are in general small and insignificant, with the exception of the impact
of income and the standard deviation of schooling. Interestingly we find that when
groups are assigned, migration is more likely when group members are wealthier.
This suggests that the negative effect of wealth when groups are not assigned comes
form coordination problems. Finally, an increase the standard deviation of educa-
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tion within the group leads to a large and statistically significant. This observation
provides some evidence that heterogenous groups find group migration less advanta-
geous, and suggest that households did take in to account the characteristics of their
migration partners.
5 Conclusion
Our work contributes to the design and implementation of policies and programs that
aim to address severe malnutrition, poverty and hunger. Our work also contributes
to the literature on urban-rural migration that views migration as both an income
maximization and risk minimization decision (Sjastaas 1962, Todaro 1969, Harris and
Todaro 1970, Stark and Levhari 1982, Stark and Bloom 1985). By examining the
costs and incentives necessary to promote migration, the research helps to identify the
non-pecuniary components of the migration decision, including psychological costs
(Carillo et al 1999), and the kinship and networks pull (Banerjee 1984, Carrington
et al 1996, Massey et al 1993, Munshi 2003, Myrdal 1944).
The empirical results presented in this paper show that credit or saving con-
straints have a first order effect in reducing migration, and thereby demonstrate the
possibility that migration is a useful method to help smooth consumption during
Monga. Our theoretical framework and empirical results regarding the impact of
groups on the migration decision, however imply that there are potentially compli-
cated social constraints on migration. Our experiment will allow for a fuller analysis
of these constraints, and allow us to unpack the causes of low migration during
Monga.
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100 villages
19 households each =  1900 households total
37 villages
Cash
31 villages
Credit
16 villages
Control
16 villages
Information
Individual Treatment
(7 households per
village)
Group Treatment
(12 households per
village)
Group Size =2
35 villages
Group Size = 3
33 villages
Assigned Partners
(6 households)
Destination
Assigned: 50%
Self-Selected: 50%
Self-Selected
Partners
(6 households)
Destination: Assigned (50%), Self-Selected (50%)
Figure 1: Randomization
8 Tables
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Table 1: Information on jobs, job availability, wage rate for selected destinations
Urban area Sectors /Jobs title Likelihood of
getting such a job
Average daily
wage (in Taka)
Bogra a) rickshaw pulling
b) construction work
c) agricultural labour
Moderate
Moderate
Moderate
150 to 200
120 to 150
80 to 100
Dhaka a) rickshaw pulling
b) construction work
c) day labour
High
High
High
250 to 300
200 to 250
150 to 200
Munshigonj a) rickshaw pulling
b) land preparation for
potato cultivation
c) agricultural labour
High
High
High
150 to 200
150 to 160
150 to 160
Tangail a) rickshaw pulling
b) construction work
c) day labourer in brick
fields
Moderate
Moderate
Moderate
200 to 250
160 to 180
150 to 200
Table 2 Distribution of households under different randomization dimensions
Group nature: A. Individual B. Assigned group C. Self-formed group Total
Group size: Two Three Two Three
Destination type: Assigned Chosen Assigned Chosen Assigned Chosen Assigned Chosen Assigned Chosen
Incentives:
a) Information only 304
b) (a) + conditional cash transfer 133 126 66 48 54 54 66 48 60 48 703
c) (a)+ conditional credit 105 112 42 54 42 48 42 54 36 54 589
Control group 304
Total # of households 238 238 108 102 96 102 108 102 96 102 1900
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Table 3. The Effect of Randomized Incentives on the Migration Decision
Condition Migration RateStd. Dev. SE(mean) No. of Obs.
Cash 40.3% 0.491 0.019 703
Credit 40.6% 0.491 0.020 589
Information 16.8% 0.374 0.021 304
Control 13.8% 0.346 0.020 304
Total 32.4% 0.468 0.011 1900
Analysis of Variance Across Conditions
Source SS df      MS F Prob > F
Between groups 26.197 3 8.732 42.48 0
Within groups 389.737 1896 0.206
Total 415.934 1899 0.219
Bartlett's test for equal variances: chi2(3) =  74.5193  Prob>chi2 = 0.000
Bonferroni Multiple Comparison Test
Cash Control Credit
Control -0.264
(0.00)
Credit 0.003 0.268
(1) (0.00)
Information -0.235 0.030 -0.238
(0.00) (1) (0.00)
T-test for the Effect of Monetary Incentives (Cash or Credit)
Group Obs Mean Std. Error Std. Deviation[95% Conf. Interval]
Control or Information 612 15.7% 0.015 0.364 0.128 0.186
Received Cash or Credit 1292 40.4% 0.014 0.491 0.377 0.431
Combined 1904 0.325 0.011 0.468 0.304 0.346
Difference (Control - Money) -0.247 0.022 -0.291 -0.203
t-value for Difference = -11.094
Degrees of Freedom = 1898
Pr(|T|>|t|)=0.000
34
Table 4. The Effect of Group-Formation Requirements on the Migration Decision
Condition Mean Std. se(mean) Freq.
Individual (No Group Requirement) 41.4% 0.493 0.023 476
Self-Formed Group 42.2% 0.494 0.024 408
Assigned Partners 37.5% 0.485 0.024 408
Total 0.404 0.491 0.014 1292
Analysis of Variance Across Conditions
Source SS df MS F Prob>F
Between Conditions 0.515 2 0.258 1.07 0.344
Within Conditions 310.584 1289 0.241
Total 311.099 1291 0.241
Bartlett's Test for Equal Variances: Chi^2(2) = 0.189, Prob>Chi^2=0.91
Bonferroni Multiple Comparison Test
Assigned Partner Individual
Individual (No Group Requirement) 0.039
[0.722]
Self-Formed Group 0.047 0.008
[0.527] [1]
Table 5. The Effect of Group Size on the Migration Decision
Condition Obs Mean Std. Error Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval]
Group Size = 2 420 42.6% 0.024 0.495 0.379 0.474
Group Size = 3 396 36.9% 0.024 0.483 0.321 0.416
Combined 816 39.8% 0.017 0.490 0.365 0.432
Difference 0.058 0.034 -0.010 0.125
Two-sample t-test for Difference Between Assigned vs. Chosen Destinations
Diff = Mean(Group Size 2) - Mean(Group Size 3)
Ho: Diff=0, Ha: diff!=0
t - -2.727
Pr(|T|>|t|)=0.094
Pr(T>t)=0.046
degrees of freedom = 1290
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Table 6. Effects of Group Type X Size Requirements on the Migration Decision
Condition Mean Std. Dev. SE(mean) No. of Obs.
Assigned Group, Size 2 39.0% 0.489 0.034 210
Assigned Group, Size 3 35.9% 0.481 0.034 198
Formed, Size 2 46.2% 0.500 0.034 210
Formed, Size 3 37.9% 0.486 0.035 198
Total 39.8% 0.490 0.017148 816
Analysis of Variance
Source SS df MS F Prob>F
Between 1.250 3 0.417 1.74 0.157
Within 194.308 812 0.239
Total 195.558 815 0.240
Bartlett's Test for Equal Variances: Chi^2(3) = 0.323, Prob>Chi^2=0.96
Bonferroni Multiple Comparison Test
Assigned, Size 2 Assigned, Size 3 Formed, Size 2
Assigned, Size 3 -0.032
[1]
Formed, Size 2 0.071 0.103
[0.81] [0.20]
Formed, Size 3 -0.012 0.020 -0.083
[1] [1] [0.52]
Table 7. The Effect of Destination Choice on the Migration Decision
Variable Obs Mean Std.Error Std. Dev [95% conf interval]
Destination was Specified 646 36.7% 0.019 0.482 0.330 0.404
Household could Choose one of 4 Destinations 646 44.1% 0.020 0.497 0.403 0.480
Combined 1292 0.404 0.014 0.491 0.377 0.431
Difference -0.074 0.027 -0.128 -0.021
Two-sample t-test for Difference Between Assigned vs. Chosen Destinations
Diff = Mean(Assigned) - Mean(Chosen)
Ho: Diff=0, Ha: diff!=0
t - -2.727
Pr(|T|>|t|)=0.006
degrees of freedom = 1290
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Table 8. The Effect of Specifying Particular Destinations on the Migration Decision
Mean Std. Dev. SE(mean) No. of Obs.
Bogra 43.4% 0.497 0.039 159
Dhaka 39.0% 0.489 0.038 164
Munshiganj 33.1% 0.472 0.037 160
Tangail 31.3% 0.465 0.036 163
Total 36.7% 0.482 0.019 646
Analysis of Variance
Source SS df MS F Prob>F
Between Groups 1.483 3 0.494 2.14 0.0944
Within Groups 148.568 642 0.231
Total 150.051 645 0.233
Bartlett's Test for Equal Variances:  chi2(3) = 0.915, Prob>chi(2) = 0.822
Bonferroni Multiple Comparison Test
Bogra Dhaka Munshiganj
Dhaka -0.044
[1]
Munshiganj -0.103 -0.059
[0.342] [1]
Tangail -0.121 -0.077 -0.018
[0.146] [0.879] [1]
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Table 9. Migration Decision as a Function of Randomized Incentives and Household Characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Did Anyone from the Household Migrate After August 2008?
0.264*** 0.003 -0.014 0.267*** 0.307*** 0.310***
(5.62) (0.06) (0.41) (5.73) (5.64) (5.70)
0.268*** 0.269*** 0.309*** 0.313***
(5.09) (5.12) (5.32) (5.30)
0.030 0.035 0.038 0.038
(0.64) (0.79) (0.85) (0.84)
-0.075** -0.120
(2.25) (3.51)
0.039
(1.29)
0.047 0.047
(1.37) (1.37)
-0.061*
(1.79)
0.006 0.043 0.042
(0.24) (1.34) (1.29)
-0.055 -0.053
(1.25) (1.20)
-0.043* -0.043* -0.032
(1.70) (1.70) (0.95)
-0.015
(0.31)
0.001* 0.001* 0.001*
(1.80) (1.78) (1.78)
0.001** 0.001** 0.001**
(2.05) (2.08) (2.07)
0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.23) (0.20) (0.20)
0.001* 0.001* 0.001*
(1.80) (1.83) (1.85)
0.138*** 0.411*** 0.595* -0.028 -0.057 -0.059
(4.86) (7.95) (6.95) (0.46) (0.91) (0.94)
Observations 1900 1292 816 1900 1900 1900
R-squared 0.06 0.01 0.02 0.07 0.08 0.08
Robust t statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Errors Clustered by Village
Cash Incentive
Credit Incentive
Information about Wages and 
Employment at Destinations
Destination was Assigned
Individual (No Group Formation 
Requirement)
Required to Form Group, but had 
Choice of Partners
Larger Group Size (3 rather than 2)
Someone in Household Can Read and 
Write
Literate Household Receiving Incentive
Household has Pucca Walls (Proxy for 
Wealth)
Household with Pucca Walls Receiving 
Transfer
Do you Believe that a Random 
Stranger is Trustworthy? (0-100 scale)
Subjective Expectation: Monga 
Occurrence this year (0-100)
Subjective Expectation: Can Send 
Remittance from Dhaka (0-100)
Subjective Expectation: Will get Social 
Network Help in Dhaka (0-100)
Constant
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(7) (8) (9) (10)
-0.123*** -0.0471 -0.0445 -0.0630
(0.0346) (0.0484) (0.0486) (0.0565)
0.0414
(0.0342)
-0.0265 -0.104 -0.105 -0.113
(0.0419) (0.0700) (0.0703) (0.0825)
-0.0707
(0.0596)
0.110
(0.0911)
0.0739 0.0693 0.0585
(0.0828) (0.0834) (0.0958)
-0.00129 -0.00206 -0.0199
(0.0829) (0.0827) (0.0957)
-0.0148 0.00532
(0.0387) (0.0661)
-0.186**
(0.0939)
-0.147
(0.121)
-0.00657
(0.0817)
0.0952
(0.0820)
0.00587
(0.0134)
0.00152
(0.0184)
-0.0310*
(0.0184)
0.657*** 0.434*** 0.381*** 0.489***
(0.120) (0.0463) (0.0783) (0.0920)
Observations 816 408 408 292
R-squared 0.027 0.011 0.013 0.034
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Standard errors in parentheses
Destination was Assigned
                                                          Did Anyone from the Household Migrate After August 2008?
Median Wealth (Pucca Wall?) Among 
Assigned Partners
Std. Dev. Of Wealth (Pucca Wall?) Across 
Assigned Partners
Years of Schooling Completed by Most 
Educated Household Member
Required to Form Group, but had Choice 
of Partners
Household has Pucca Walls (Proxy for 
Wealth)
Median Wealth (Pucca Wall?) Among 
Potential Group Members
Std. Dev.of Wealth (Pucca Wall?) Across 
Potential Group Members 
Someone in Household Can Read and 
Write
Average Literacy Among Potential Group 
Members
Std. Dev.of Literacy Across Potential 
Group Members 
Constant
Median Education (Max. Schooling) 
Among Assigned Partners 
Std. Dev. Of Education (max schooling) 
Among Assigned Partners
Median Literacy Among Assigned 
Partners
Std. Dev. Of Literacy Across Assigned 
partners
39
